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PROTECTING YOUR ENVIRONMENT, 
EXACERBATING INJUSTICE:                                
AVOIDING “MANDATE HAVENS” 
 
DAVID TAKACS† 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The story in the “Business Day” section of the New York Times 
begins, somewhat breathlessly: “San Diego – In an unmarked greenhouse, 
leafy bushes carpet an acre of land here tucked into the suburban sprawl of 
Southern California.  The seeds of the inedible, drought-resistant plants, 
called jatropha, produce a prize: high quality oil that can be refined into 
low-carbon jet fuel or diesel fuel.” The SGB company, whose mission is 
“Bringing the opportunities of energy crops to reality,”1 uses DNA 
sequencing technology to grow hybridized, domesticated strains of 
jatropha.  SGB “has deals to plant 250,000 acres of jatropha in Brazil, 
India, and other countries expected to eventually produce about 70 million 
gallons of fuel a year.  That has attracted the interest of energy giants, 
airlines, and other multinational companies seeking alternatives to fossil 
fuels.”  Why?  “They see jatropha as a hedge against spikes in petroleum 
prices and as a way to comply with government mandates that require the 
use of low-carbon fuels.”2 
Nowhere in 1300+ words does the author discuss where the quarter of 
a million acres would come from.  What grows on that land now?  Who, in 
Brazil, or India, or “other countries,” depends on that land for their 
livelihoods? How is SGB obtaining rights to that land?  Despite claims that 
jatropha grows on “wastelands”—poor soils with little water—analyses by 
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 1.  About, SEEDS, GENOMICS, BIOMATERIALS, http://sgbiofuels.com/pages/company/index.php 
(last visited Apr. 3, 2014). 
2. Todd Woody, Jet Fuel by the Acre, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 2013, at B1.   
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the Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR) and others suggest 
that the booming (or blooming) market for jatropha is displacing traditional 
crops grown for food, or grown on land where forests previously grew, 
including high biodiversity value forests in Ghana, Tanzania, and 
Mozambique.3  CIFOR suggests that investors speculating on this incipient 
boom are buying up swathes of forestland—while undermining 
environmental sustainability in the developing world—to help fulfill 
environmental quality mandates in the developed world.4 
The axioms of the environmental justice (EJ) movement obtain abroad 
as well as at home: 1) some people—disproportionately poor, 
disproportionately of color—bear a disproportionate cost of the 
externalities of industrial overproduction and overconsumption; 2) some 
people—disproportionately poor, disproportionately of color—are far less 
likely to enjoy the benefits of this overproduction and overconsumption, 
including environmental amenities like clean air, clean water, waste buried 
out of sight and mind, green space to enjoy, or simply access to nature’s 
products and services that make life possible; and 3) democracy in decision 
making, where the poorest are full participants and are building capacity to 
negotiate for fair shares of burdens and benefits, is crucial to achieve an 
environmentally just world. 
In other words, EJ requires distributive and procedural justice. While 
the EJ movement this Symposium issue celebrates arose in the United 
States, its central tenets apply if we are to achieve justice across 
international borders.5 Global EJ concerns itself with the transboundary 
distribution of environmental burdens and benefits and the resulting 
unequal distribution of environmental benefits and burdens.6 This paper 
examines what happens when mandates to clean up local environments and 
to mitigate greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in the global North result in 
environmental injustice in the global South.7  It proposes solutions to 
 
 3.  See Gao et al., A Global Analysis of Deforestation Due to Biofuel Development 26, 27–28 
(Ctr. for Int’l Forestry Research, Working Paper 68, 2011). See also Mackinnon Lawrence, Biofuels 
Producers Hunting Foreign Fields, FORBES (Oct. 23, 2013, 11:31 AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/pikeresearch/2013/10/23/biofuels-producers-hunting-foreign-fields. 
 4.  See Gao et al., supra note 3, at 26–28. 
 5.  See Tom E.R.B. West, Environmental Justice and International Climate Change Legislation: 
A Cosmopolitan Perspective, 25 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 129, 130–31 (2012). 
 6.  André Nollkaemper, Sovereignty and Environmental Justice in International Law, in 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND JUSTICE IN CONTEXT 253, 259. 
 7.  I use “North” to refer to developed or industrialized nations. Until recently, Northern nations 
have been primarily responsible for creating the problems of global climate change through pollution 
associated with industrialization. “Southern” nations are those in the process of development; Southern 
nations are least responsible for creating global climate change, yet will suffer the most from its 
consequences. 
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prevent Northern environmental laws from creating unjust climate change 
“mandate havens” in poor, distant communities. 
While reviews of international justice cite the “philosophical 
pandemonium”8 of what “justice” actually means, I would offer the 
clarification that what is “just” is what is “deeply equitable.”  By “deep 
equity,” I refer to laws, policies, and cultural practices that act in synergy to 
maximize the health and potential of all individuals, communities, and 
ecosystems. The equity is “deep” because values take root within each 
individual. It is also deep because it asks that we fundamentally 
reformulate our community structures and responsibilities, and situate these 
values and responsibilities in our legal systems and policy choices. Our 
laws and policies would, in turn, support values and actions promoting 
even deeper equity.9 
If we seek to realize international EJ through laws and policies that 
create a deeply equitable world, addressing global climate change is our 
most obvious current starting place.  Climate change stems from current 
and historical overconsumption of global resources leading to planetary 
climactic disruptions that will disproportionately harm the poorest 
people—who did least to create the problem.10  While historically the U.S. 
and other developed nations have been the primary drivers of climate 
change, increasingly the developing world is exacerbating the problem, and 
it is the wealthiest in those countries, as well, who will benefit at the 
expense of the poorest.  Prof. Paul Harris calls for a “moral 
cosmopolitanism” that “requires us more carefully and explicitly to 
consider the obligations of the world’s affluent people—those who 
consume the most (including great quantities of things we do not need) and 
generate the most atmospheric pollution per capita—to do much more to 
address this problem, regardless of whether they live in affluent or poor 
states.”11 
These obligations find legal expression in the principle of Common 
 
 8.  PAUL G. HARRIS, WORLD ETHICS AND CLIMATE CHANGE: FROM INTERNATIONAL TO 
GLOBAL JUSTICE 32 (2010). 
 9.  David Takacs, Forest Carbon Offsets and International Law: A Deep Equity Legal Analysis, 
22 GEO. INT’L. ENVTL. L. REV. 521, 526 (2010).   
 10.  UN-REDD PROGRAMME, GUIDELINES ON FREE, PRIOR AND INFORMED CONSENT 8–10 
(2013), available at http://www.un-redd.org/Launch_of_FPIC_Guidlines/tabid/105976/Default .aspx 
(follow the link “UN-REDD Programme Guidelines on Free, Prior, and Informed Consent (FPIC)); 
Stephanie Baez, The “Right” REDD Framework: National Laws That Best Protect Indigenous Rights 
in a Global REDD Regime, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 821, 840 (2011); ANNELIE FINCKE, INDIGENOUS 
PEOPLES AND REDD-PLUS: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE ENGAGEMENT OF INDIGENOUS 
PEOPLES AND LOCAL COMMUNITIES IN REDD-PLUS, 2–3 (2010), available at 
http://cmsdata.iucn.org/downloads/a4_iucn_indigenous_peoples_and_ redd_.pdf. 
 11.  HARRIS, supra note 8, at 2. 
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but Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR)—the foundational legal and 
ethical principle under UNFCCC/Kyoto Protocol.12  As described in the 
UNFCCC’s Art. 3(1): 
The Parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of present 
and future generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and in 
accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and 
respective capabilities. Accordingly, the developed country Parties should 
take the lead in combating climate change and the adverse effects thereof.13 
CBDR would require that all nations mitigate GHG emissions and 
contribute to adaptation efforts, but requires more significant contributions 
from Northern nations (and, if we follow Harris’ view, all wealthy 
citizens). The climate change conventions’ legal requirements combine 
pragmatism with ethics. Pragmatically, some nations, predominantly in the 
global North, have greater financial resources to mitigate GHG buildup and 
help other nations adapt; those nations gained these resources from 
industrial development whose excesses continue to pollute the global 
atmospheric commons. Thus the North bears the primary responsibility to 
reduce emissions and help the South adapt to the pollution the North has 
emitted en route to economic prosperity.14 
In carrying out their common but differentiated responsibilities, the 
North should not exacerbate the injustices it purports to be mitigating.  
Differences in wealth, power, environmental burdens, and environmental 
benefits should narrow, not widen.  While developed nations have enriched 
themselves without paying for the pollution externalities of their 
development, these nations are now beginning to support international 
treaties and pass domestic laws that require curbing their GHG emissions 
(while simultaneously fulfilling other domestic environmental goals.)  The 
rules chosen to mitigate GHG buildup and adapt to climate changes that 
 
 12.  For an overview of CBDR, see Takacs, supra note 9, at 538–41 (2010); United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 106, 31 I.L.M. 849 (1992) 
(“[T]he global nature of climate change calls for the widest possible cooperation by all countries and 
their participation in an effective and appropriate international response, in accordance with their 
Common but Differentiated Responsibilities and respective capabilities and their social and economic 
conditions.”). See also Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, art. 10, Dec. 11, 1997, 2303 U.N.T.S. 148, 37 I.L.M. 22 (imposing obligations on the parties 
based on CBDR); Lavanya Rajamani, The Nature, Promise, and Limits of Differential Treatment in the 
Climate Regime, 16 Y.B. INT'L ENVTL. L. 81, 93 (2005). 
 13.  United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, supra note 12, 1771 U.N.T.S. at 
169. 
 14.  See Anita M. Halvorssen, Common, But Differentiated Commitments in the Future Climate 
Change Regime–Amending the Kyoto Protocol to Include Annex C and the Annex C Mitigation Fund, 
18 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 247, 254–55 (2007); Philippe Cullet & Annie Patricia Kameri-
Mbote, Activities Implemented Jointly in the Forestry Sector: Conceptual and Operational Fallacies, 
10 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 97, 102–03 (1997); Rajamani, supra note 12, at 89, 93. 
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cannot be prevented will be judged “fair” according to how those rules 
distribute costs and benefits among the world’s citizens, and the processes 
under which these rules are derived and implemented; what is “fair” is also 
what is “deeply equitable.”15 
Poor, rural citizens in developing nations seldom have power to 
influence environmental decision-making in their own nations, let alone in 
foreign nations.16  Often their land is their only asset—whether they own it, 
or are in some type of usufruct arrangement for leasing the land and its 
services, or are relying on traditional laws of community use, or simply are 
dependent on forest products and free ecosystem services.17  They suffer 
most when decisions about their land are made to maximize capital in 
distant capitals. As Schlosberg expresses it, “Democratic and participatory 
decision-making procedures are then both an element of, and a condition 
for, social justice.”18 Suttles asserts that the EJ movement is a 
“transformative, participatory social campaign” that “functions on a 
democratic, nonhierarchical level that espouses a ‘bottom up’ approach 
involving all members of the affected population. As such, it is a distinctly 
empowering vehicle that galvanizes and catalyzes ordinary people to 
advocate in their own self-interest.”19 
I have written elsewhere about Environmental Democracy in REDD+ 
in developing nations:20 When making decisions about how vital 
environmental resources will be used, local communities should be full 
partners.  Local citizens understand the land and resources, and depend on 
these resources.  Environmental democracy norms comprise the right to 
participate in environmental decision-making; the right to access to 
information on environmental decisions; the right to redress and remedy 
when environmental rights are violated; and the right to Free Prior and 
Informed Consent (FPIC) when governments formulate plans that will 
 
 15.  RUCHI ANAND, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: A NORTH-SOUTH PERSPECTIVE 
11 (2004).  For a thorough review of Environmental Democracy, see David Takacs, Environmental 
Democracy and Forest Carbon (REDD+), 44 ENVTL. L. 71, 96 (2014). 
 16.  Tseming Yang, International Environmental Protection: Human Rights and the North-South 
Divide, in JUSTICE AND NATURAL RESOURCES: CONCEPTS, STRATEGIES AND APPLICATIONS 87, 90 
(Kathryn M. Mutz, Gary C. Bryner, & Douglas S. Kenney eds., 2002); see Carmen Gonzalez, 
Genetically Modified Organisms and Justice: The International Environmental Justice Implications of 
Biotechnology, 19 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 583, 639 (2007). 
 17.  Gonzalez, supra note 16, at 591; David Takacs, FOREST CARBON: LAW + PROPERTY RIGHTS 
15 (2009). 
 18.  David Schlosberg, Reconceiving Environmental Justice: Global Movements and Political 
Theories, 13 ENVTL. POL. 517, 519 (2004). 
 19.  John T. Suttles Jr., Transmigration of Hazardous Industry: The Global Race to the Bottom, 
Environmental Justice, and the Asbestos Industry, 16 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 35–36 (2002).  
 20.  See generally Takacs, supra note 15. 
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affect vital resources and lands.  When governments or developers of 
environmental conservation and development programs fail to respect 
environmental democracy norms, they may consign a project to failure, and 
worse, violate the human rights and even destroy the lives of local 
citizens.21 
I and other scholars have analyzed the justice implications of climate 
change: those who have done least to create the problem will suffer the 
most.22  In this article I offer a twist: I examine what happens when 
Northern GHG-reducing laws and policies (designed to avoid catastrophic, 
global ecosystem change and the resulting environmental injustices that 
will redound)  paradoxically exacerbate injustice.  To avoid this, we must 
pay close attention to populations in distant lands that will be impacted if 
our laws are implemented carelessly. Various authors have described 
environmental injustices in international agreements where the North 
carries disproportionate power in determining the results of negotiated 
solutions to climate change and other environmental problems.23  Anand 
notes that the “North is likely to use its position of privilege and power to 
maximize the benefits it receives and minimize its costs, even at the 
expense of justice or equity.”24  The examples I discuss herein pertain not 
only to the terms of transnational legal instruments, but also to Northern 
domestic laws purporting to ameliorate injustice, but instead sometimes 
perpetuating it.  These examples illustrate situations where nations, their 
businesses, and their citizens, try to fulfill legal and ethical mandates at low 
cost, with justice and equity possibly suffering as a result.  Injustices are 
perpetuated on poor people in rural areas in the South by citizens of the 
North (and, in some cases, elites within their own nations), whose original 
intentions may (sometimes) have been well-meaning, but who have not 
considered the injustice offsets of their policies. 
This paper starts with this observation: To compensate for a grave 
environmental injustice–– climate change caused by industrial pollution—
Northern legal solutions should not exacerbate the problem. In this article, I 
describe how EJ goals are undermined when domestic nations of the North 
implement GHG-reducing laws, and I offer some solutions towards 
ensuring that laws aimed to improve domestic environments and to 
 
 21.  For a thorough review, see id. 
 22.  Naomi Roht-Arriaza, ‘First, Do No Harm’: Human Rights and Efforts to Combat Climate 
Change, GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 593, 594 (2010); UN-REDD PROGRAMME, supra note 10, at 8–10; 
Baez, supra note 10, at 840; Fincke supra note 10, at 2–3; HARRIS, supra note 8, at 2.  
 23.  David Hunter, Human Rights Implications for Climate Change Negotiations, 11 OR. REV. 
INT’L L. 331, 358 (2009).  
 24. Anand, supra note 15, at 56. 
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mitigate the externalities of Northern consumption actually contribute to a 
more just world. 
Drawing on the concept of “pollution havens”—places in the global 
South that attract the worst industrial excess of the North’s production and 
consumption—I introduce the concept of “mandate havens.”  In a “mandate 
haven,” a Northern body will pass a law mandating environmental 
protection; its implementation, however, may have (perhaps unintended) 
detrimental impacts in the South.  Such mandates include international 
agreements driven by Northern negotiators, national and subnational laws 
implementing international commitments, or voluntary efforts of citizens 
and businesses.  How these initiatives are worded and implemented has 
profound impacts in the South, in locations where communities have 
played a scant role in creating climate change or in formulating the 
solutions to the problems they have not created but whose effects they will 
bear. 
In particular, I explain how mandate havens result from laws requiring 
biofuels production, and from laws that facilitate Reducing Emissions from 
Deforestation and forest Degradation, or “REDD+.”  I appraise mandate 
havens resulting from EU and US laws requiring increasing production of 
plant-based fuels to replace traditional hydrocarbon-based biofuels, and 
show how the developing world is proving an ever more conducive place to 
grow the plants that provide the feedstock for biofuels. I display how 
biofuels laws result in unjust mandate havens in the developing world, with 
scant attention from the developed world for the impacts of their policies.  I 
then introduce REDD+, where investors pay people—usually in the global 
South—to reforest degraded land or to refrain from cutting down trees; the 
investor can sell the carbon thus stored in these trees on an international 
market.  I review how promoters of both biofuels plantations and REDD+ 
paint win-win-win scenarios that these schemes help climate, the local 
environment, and impoverished rural people, and demonstrate that the 
reality, however, may be quite different on the ground, as local 
communities may lose access to land essential to their livelihoods. I present 
potential solutions to unjust mandate havens: models are emerging for how 
governments, businesses, and private citizens can work across national 
boundaries to mitigate environmental injustice both through reducing 
pollution back home while alleviating poverty and protecting local 
ecosystems abroad. These EJ enhancing models can and should be 
implemented for both biofuels and REDD+. 
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POLLUTION HAVENS 
 
Discussing international economic interdependence and justice, Beitz 
describes “a pattern of relationships which are largely non-voluntary from 
the point of view of the worse-off participants, and which produce benefits 
for some while imposing burdens on others.”  This inequality “has the 
effect of taxing poor nations so that others may benefit from living in ‘just’ 
regimes.”25 
To illustrate this concept in the environmental realm, various authors 
have described “pollution havens.”26 Pollution—an externality created by 
industrial society—may follow the path of least resistance to those least 
able to refuse the burden.  Developed nations regulate industrial activity to 
minimize their own economic and environmental burdens for the benefits 
of their own citizens who demand both salubrious environmental quality 
and cheaper goods.27 When the costs of complying with these 
environmental regulations are greater than the costs of relocating a business 
or transporting its waste products, it makes business (albeit not justice) 
sense to shift production or waste disposal to the developing world, where 
standards (and enforcement of those standards) are weaker.28 
Although some authors question the empirical evidence for pollution 
havens,29 others cite clear evidence that businesses do, in fact, pollute 
elsewhere when it becomes too expensive to comply with pollution 
regulations back home.30  Developing nations may engage in a “race to the 
bottom”: they deregulate to attract desperately needed economic 
development, even if that development results in environmental 
degradation.31  As Keeton expresses it, “the race to the bottom and its 
resulting disparity will thus linger as an unfortunate byproduct of domestic 
environmental regulation.”32 
As developed nations tighten their pollution and other environmental 
 
 25.  Charles R. Beitz, Justice and International Relations, 4 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 360, 374–75 
(1975). 
 26.  Chelsea M. Keeton, Sharing Sustainability: Preventing International Environmental Injustice 
in an Age of Regulation, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 1167, 1171–73 (2012). 
 27.  Antonius R. Hippolyte, Calls for National Intervention in the Toxic Waste Trade with Africa: 
A Contemporary Issue in the Environmental Justice Debate, 58 LOY. L. REV. 301, 312 (2012); see 
Kenda Jo M. McCrory, The International Exportation of Waste: The Battle of the Path of Least 
Resistance, 9 DICK. INT'L L. ANN. 339, 340 (1991). 
 28.  See, e.g., Suttles, supra note 19, at 11–12. 
 29.  See, e.g., Gunnar S. Eskeland & Ann E. Harrison, Moving to Greener Pastures? 
Multinationals and the Pollution Haven Hypothesis, 70 J. DEV. ECON. 1 (2003). 
 30.  Keeton, supra note 26, at 1169. 
 31.  Id.; Hippolyte, supra note 27, at 302.  
 32.  Keeton, supra note 26, at 1176. 
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laws to protect the health and quality of life of their citizens, we close our 
eyes to those who may suffer out of sight as a result of our own ever more 
rigorous standards.33 For example, tightened regulation and torts suits over 
asbestos in the developed world shifted asbestos manufacture to developing 
nations, where “competitive deregulation” meant that “asbestos is life” for 
desperately poor people who had no choice but to face the health risks 
associated with its manufacture.34 Shipping e-waste and toxic waste to the 
Global South for processing  (estimates of 3 million tons of hazardous 
waste from the North to other nations each year35), or relocating factory 
production to developing nations with lax environmental and safety 
standards that wouldn’t meet Northern regulatory laws create “havens” for 
practices that would not meet Northern legal standards. We in the North 
protect our quality of life by dumping on the already poor in the South, 
widening inequality and fomenting environmental injustice.36 
 
CLIMATE CHANGE MANDATE HAVENS 
 
Under the Polluter Pays Principle, polluters should bear the cost of 
cleaning up messes they have made.37  Yet the developed world has not 
fully paid, and is not fully paying, for the pollution externalities we have 
ignored en route to enriching ourselves. To fulfill the Polluter Pays 
Principle, and to compensate for grave environmental justices caused by 
our GHG pollution, our solutions should mitigate and not exacerbate 
problems our pollution causes. 
Yet, increasingly, land in the developing world is arrogated by what I 
call “climate change mandate havens.”  In their attempts to address GHG 
pollution of the atmospheric commons caused by historical and continued 
overconsumption of fossil fuels, nations of the global North have passed 
laws designed to force citizens and industries to reduce GHG emissions 
while weaning themselves from high-GHG emitting fossil fuels.  Or, 
citizens and businesses take it upon themselves to find ways to offset their 
own GHG emissions.  But even when intentioned to result in greater 
environmental justice, methods of complying with these GHG reductions 
may result in greater environmental injustice. 
As Prof. Alice Kaswan writes, movements to promote both 
“sustainability” and EJ seek to “guard against the risk of ‘tunnel vision’: 
 
 33.  See Hippolyte, supra note 27, at 303; Keeton, supra note 26, at 1178. 
 34.  See Suttles, supra note 19, at 28–29.  
 35.  Hippolyte, supra note 27, at 308.  
 36.  Keeton, supra note 26, at 1178; Suttles, supra note 19, at 35; Gonzalez, supra note 16, at 590.  
 37.  West, supra note 5, at 153–56. 
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one-dimensional environmental policymaking that fixates on a single goal 
(like reductions in GHG emissions) without considering or addressing 
broader implications.”38  Acknowledging the possibilities of injustice is the 
first step towards justice.  We are more likely to address international 
environmental injustice if we explicitly address international EJ in our laws 
or in standards that govern how our laws are to be implemented across 
national borders. 
When calculating actual GHG reductions from any climate change 
legal prescription, entities increasingly must perform full cost, “life cycle” 
accounting: We look at the GHGs emitted when raw materials are obtained 
and transported, products are manufactured, land uses change indirectly to 
accommodate GHG-saving land uses elsewhere, etc.39 Lifecycle 
greenhouse gas emissions are defined as the aggregate quantity of 
greenhouse gas emissions (including direct emissions and significant 
indirect emissions such as significant emissions from land use changes), 
related to the full fuel life cycle, including feedstock generation, extraction, 
distribution and delivery, and use of finished fuel.40  In the U.S., to qualify 
as “renewable,” under federal law, a fuel’s pathway must reduce lifecycle 
GHG gas emissions by 20% compared to baseline lifecycle GHG 
emissions—defined as the average lifecycle GHG emissions for gasoline or 
diesel (whichever is being replaced by the renewable fuel) sold or 
distributed as transportation fuel in 2005.41  When calculating GHG 
emission reductions to comprise not just direct land clearance but indirect 
land use changes (ILUCs), some studies suggest biofuels mandates may 
increase GHG emissions.42 
We should adopt this “life cycle” approach for social justice 
safeguards, as well. That is to say, we should do a full cost, life cycle 
international environmental justice accounting when designing, 
implementing, and monitoring our climate change legal mandates. 
One might hope that international law could address the injustices of 
climate change mandate havens.  But international law, as currently 
formulated, is not sufficiently robust to address the problems of 
international EJ discussed here.  Proposed solutions to avoid transnational 
pollution havens include trade barriers, extraterritorial regulation, and 
 
 38.  Alice Kaswan, Environmental Justice and Environmental Law, 24 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 
149, 170 (2013). 
 39.  See, e.g., PRODUCT LIFE CYCLE ACCOUNTING AND REPORTING STANDARD, GREENHOUSE 
GAS PROTOCOL (2011), available at http://www.ghgprotocol.org/files/ghgp/public /Product-Life-Cycle-
Accounting-Reporting-Standard_041613.pdf.  
 40.  42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(1)(H) (2010). 
 41.  40 C.F.R. § 80.1401 (2013). 
 42.  See Gao, et al., supra note 3, at 23. 
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international legal agreements.43  But all of these remain aspirational, 
cumbersome, unpredictable, time consuming, and resource intensive.  
International Human Rights Law requires nations to respect, protect, and 
fulfill the human rights of their own citizens.44 But economically 
challenged Southern nations hosting biofuels and REDD+ schemes have 
incentives to accept the benefits of biofuels and REDD+, and lack the 
power to counter the hegemonic international actors promoting these 
ventures. Northern nations promoting biofuels and REDD+ have incentives 
to allow their citizens and corporations to continue to profit from these 
schemes, and often lack legal jurisdiction to remediate problems in distant 
locales.  International law simply has not worked to contain pollution 
havens, and its mechanisms are unlikely to work soon or comprehensively 
to address these problems. 
Of course we should continue to develop and employ existing 
international human rights law processes to address mandate havens. But I 
would offer other, practicable options to fill in the dysfunctional gaps of 
domestic laws in North and South and international law working across 
borders.  Self-monitoring—whether it is individuals, businesses, or 
nations—with external validation is a crucial step towards ensuring 
international EJ in climate change mandate havens.  When writing 
domestic legislation in the North or when formulating standards for 
business self-regulation of offsets, specific standards should include clear 
criteria for how laws mandating biofuels or carbon offsets may or may not 
operate.  Mandates may incorporate NGOs as certifiers and verifiers of 
compliance with national requirements, or require government inspectors to 
ensure compliance.45 
Furthermore, these standards, if widely implemented, can lead to 
custom. I am not speaking of “customary international law,” where nations 
consistently adhere to a norm, and act thusly because they believe they are 
legally bound to do so—although that is a desirable goal.  I am merely 
saying that these standards may become industry custom, because they are 
too expensive to circumvent, or to devise and implement alternate 
standards, or it becomes morally unacceptable to devise and implement less 
equitable standards. 
If biofuels mandates require close attention to whose land the biofuels 
are grown on, and to protecting the most vulnerable from (un)intended 
ancillary impacts, it will make usurping land abroad for biofuels more 
difficult or impossible. Justice-enhancing implementing standards will raise 
 
 43.  Keeton, supra note 26, at 1195. 
 44.  Roht-Arriaza, supra note 22, at 595.  
 45.  Suttles, Jr., supra note 19, at 46. 
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the cost of biofuels, and thus force consumers to consume less rather than 
continue to consume an equal amount of fuel that has questionable 
environmental benefits in the first place. If REDD+ projects and regional 
schemes must attend both to MMRV requirements46 that ensure everyone is 
doing what they say and to environmental democracy rights that guarantee 
procedures for maximum participation from local communities who will be 
most affected (for better or worse), REDD+ may become a scheme for 
realization of genuine CBDR, whether it is nation to nation, state to state, 
or citizen to citizen, where the wealthiest pay the full price of our “offsets.”  
Or, REDD+ may become too expensive, in which case we may lose its 
biodiversity benefits but also lose a pressure valve that allows us to 
continue our profligate, GHG emitting habits. Full cost EJ accounting in 
REDD+ may mean what we lose in prospective scale of REDD+ we may 
make up in quality of projects that genuinely promote international EJ.  For 
both biofuels and REDD+, full cost, life cycle accounting for inequitable 
social impacts must be included if we are to avoid creating environmentally 
unjust climate change mandate havens. 
 
BIOFUELS: CLEAN FUELS WITH DIRTY HANDS 
WHY DO WE NEED TO ATTEND TO EJ WHEN IMPLEMENTING BIOFUEL 
LAWS? 
 
Various Northern governments—for example the EU, the US federal 
government, and California—have adopted Renewable Fuel Standards 
(RFS) that mandate that fuels must contain a certain percentage of plant 
based feedstocks.47  Laws promoting the rush to biofuels emphasize 
enhancing domestic energy security and reducing GHG emissions. 
Corn and sugar cane are the primary biofuel feedstocks, although 
sorghum, castor bean, sugar beet, sunflower, and, as mentioned earlier, 
jatropha are also in production.48  “Second generation” biofuels, from the 
“waste” parts like the leaves on a corn stalk, or from wood and agricultural 
waste, remain a goal desired,49 but still not technologically feasible for 
 
 46.  See generally David Takacs, Forest Carbon (REDD+), Repairing International Trust, and 
Reciprocal Contractual Sovereignty, 37 VT. L. REV. 653, 716 (2013). 
 47.  Gao, supra note 3, at 2. 
 48.  Id. at 3. 
 49.  Roht-Arriaza points out that even second-generation biofuels can potentially have justice 
implications.  Economic benefits from “waste” products can provide the marginal benefit that tilts land 
use towards large-scale monocultures.  And so-called “waste” may sometimes be useful to local people.  
For example, in a Clean Development Project in Thailand, rice husks viewed by project developers as 
waste were components of traditional fertilizers. Roht-Arriaza, supra note 22, at 600. 
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widespread use.50 
Over 60% of US GHG emissions come from combusting fossil fuels.51  
Just over half of this comes from producing electricity, and just under 30% 
is generated by transportation.52 In the US, the RFS was first required as 
part of the 2005 Energy Policy Act, which mandated 7.5 billion gallons of 
renewable fuel to be blended into gasoline by 2012.53 US law now requires 
that fuel providers provide increasing volumes of both traditional (e.g. 
ethanol from corn or sugar cane) and second-generation biofuels yearly 
through 2022,54 with the 2007 Energy Independence and Security Act 
requiring 36 billion gallons of renewable fuel by 2022.55  Nearly all 
gasoline sold in the US contains 10% ethanol; in Brazil, most vehicles can 
use a 100% ethanol blend.56  Corn comprises nearly all ethanol used in 
fuels in the US, and about 40% of the nation’s corn goes not into food, but 
into ethanol.57  In the last decade, worldwide biofuel production has 
increased five-fold.58  In the US between 2000–2012, ethanol production 
increased by more than 700%.59 
The stated policy rationales for the RFS are to improve US energy 
security, to improve rural (US) economies, and to reduce GHG emissions.60  
Furthermore, biofuels are promoted as burning cleaner, thus enhancing the 
 
 50.  Id. at 4. 
 51.  Sources of Greenhouse Gas Emissions, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/ghgemissions/sources.html (last updated June 14, 2012). 
 52.  U.S. DEP’T OF  TRANSP., TRANSPORTATION’S ROLE IN REDUCING U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS 
EMISSIONS  ES-2 (2010), available at http://ntl.bts.gov/lib/32000/32700/32779/DOT_ 
Climate_Change_Report_-_April_2010_- _Volume_1_and_2.pdf.  
 53.  Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives: Renewable Fuel Standard Program, 72 Fed. Reg. 
23,900, 23,903 (May 1, 2007) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 80). 
 54.   Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives; Changes to Renewable Fuel Standard; 75 Fed. Reg. 
14,670, 14,673 (Mar. 26, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 80) [hereinafter RFS2 Final 
Rule/Renewable Fuel Standard 2”]. 
 55.  42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(2)(B)(i)(I) (2010). For a history of the RFS in US Law, see Timothy A. 
Slating & Jay P. Kesan, The Renewable Fuel Standard 3.0?: Moving Forward with the Federal Biofuel 
Mandate, 20 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 374, 417 (2014). 
 56.  Slating & Kesan, supra note 55, at 387–88. 
 57.  World Fuel Ethanol Production, RENEWABLE FUELS ASS’N, http://ethanolrfa.org/ 
pages/World-Fuel-Ethanol-Production (last visited Feb. 23, 2014).; Stephen Rattner, The Great Corn 
Con, N.Y. TIMES (June 24, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/25/opinion/25Rattner.html. 
 58.  NICOLE CONDON, HEATHER KLEMICK & ANN WOLVERTON, IMPACTS OF ETHANOL POLICY 
ON CORN PRICES: A REVIEW AND META-ANALYSIS OF RECENT EVIDENCE 3 (2013) (presentation at 
Agricultural & Applied Economics Association’s 2013 AAEA & CAES Joint Annual Meeting, 
Washington, D.C., August 4–6, 2013), available at http://ageconsearch 
.umn.edu/bitstream/149940/2/Corn%20Ethanol%20and%20Food%20Prices%202013%20AAEA_subm
ission.pdf. 
 59.  CONDON ET AL., supra note 58, at 5. 
 60.  Slating & Kesan, supra note 55, at 398–99. 
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quality of US air, as mandated by the 1990 Amendments to the US Clean 
Air Act.61  Congress was attentive to ward off any adverse, unintended 
consequences to the economy or ecology of the US62, and EPA has 
clarified it can only grant a waiver if the RFS is to impact the economy of a 
region, state, or our entire nation.63 
Neither Congress nor EPA has attended to potential or realized 
adverse consequences to economies or ecologies beyond the US borders.  
Neither, for that matter, do many mainstream environmental critiques of 
the RFS.  These emphasize ancillary environmental impacts of the RFS—
especially failure to do life cycle accounting for GHGs, and failure to 
account for indirect land use changes64—but pay scant attention to the out 
of sight/out of mind environmental injustices of RFS domestic mandates. 
Critics allege that biofuels mandates do little to reduce GHG 
emissions, and may even emit more GHGs than conventional fuels.65 For 
example, in Congressional Testimony, Scott Faber of the Environmental 
Working Group cites studies that corn ethanol emits 28% more GHGs than 
the equivalent amount of traditional gasoline.66 In Brazil, which decades 
ago made a commitment to energy self-sufficiency through biofuels67, 
sugar cane is cheaper and produces more GHG savings; however, few 
locations in the US can grow sugar cane.68  Whatever its GHG reducing 
potential, huge federal subsidies lead to a cost of $750/ton of CO2 
reductions, which makes little economic sense, given other, cheaper means 
of reducing CO2.69 
Revisions of the US RFS now mandate a lifecycle analysis for GHG 
emissions, giving a more accurate picture of true GHG savings.  
 
 61.  See id. at 19. 
 62.  See 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(7)(A). 
 63.  See, e.g., id.; Notice of Decision Regarding the State of Texas Request for a Waiver of a 
Portion of the Renewable Fuel Standard, 73 Fed. Reg. 47,168, 47,172 (Aug. 13, 2008);   
Notice of Decision Regarding Requests for a Waiver of the Renewable Fuel Standard, 77 Fed. Reg. 
70,752 (Nov. 27, 2012). 
 64.  See, e.g., THE UNINTENDED ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS OF THE RENEWABLE FUELS 
STANDARD, ENVTL. WORKING GROUP (Aug 29, 2008), available at http://static.ewg.org 
/reports/2008/rfs/0820RFfactsheet.pdf. 
 65.  See, e.g., Rattner, supra note 57. 
 66.  Only at the end of his testimony does Mr. Faber refer to food insecurity “around the globe.”  
See Scott Faber, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Energy and Power of the House Committee on 
Energy and Commerce on Overview of the Renewable Fuel Standard (July 24 2013), available at 
http://www.ewg.org/testimony-official-correspondence/overview-renewable-fuel-standard-stakeholder-
perspectives. 
 67.  Erik Bluemel, Biomass Energy: Ensuring Sustainability Through Conditioned Economic 
Incentives, 19 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 673, 678–79 (2007). 
 68.  See Slating & Kesan, supra note 55, at 383.  
 69.  Rattner, supra note 57. 
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Regulators’ calculations must include all emissions associated with 
growing the crop, transporting the crop to production and fueling facilities, 
converting the crop to ethanol, and indirect land use changes that might 
result from biofuel production.70  Renewable fuels produced in facilities 
that began construction after December 19, 2007 must reduce GHG 
emissions at least 20% compared to baseline lifecycle GHG emissions.71 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to evaluate whether or not biofuels 
meet the GHG reducing benefits its backers claim, or actually exacerbate 
the problem.72 But it does seem likely that fulfilling the demands of EU and 
US biofuels mandates is causing massive international environmental 
injustice in distant lands to fulfill a (possibly) well-intentioned GHG 
reduction mandate that will do little to reduce GHG emissions and may 
even increase them while at the same time allowing Northern 
overconsumption to continue unabated. 
 
ACCOUNTING FOR INJUSTICE 
 
As noted above, crops to supply biofuels mandates have to be grown 
somewhere, and that somewhere is often in climate change mandate havens 
in the global South.  It is difficult to know how much acreage biofuels have 
usurped: attempting to directly tie biofuels mandates to land clearing or 
food insecurity in the global South is methodologically cumbersome.73  
CIFOR estimates that 2.3% of global agricultural land is dedicated to 
producing crops for biofuels; some estimates of up to 36% of land by 2030 
will be required for biofuel production.74  Soybeans used to produce biofuel 
in Mato Grosso, Brazil account for up to 5.9% of deforestation in the last 
few years in addition to increasing tensions for who can control the land, 
indigenous people working in Brazilian biofuel fields confront labor 
abuses.75 Brazil is also attracting major corporate investors in oil palms to 
produce biofuels.76 Oil palm for biofuels resulted in 2.8%–6.5% of 
 
 70.  42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(1)(H) (2010). 
 71.  42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(2)(A)(i) (2010). 
 72.  See Timothy Searchinger et al., Use of U.S. Croplands for Biofuels Increases Greenhouse 
Gases Through Emissions from Land-Use Change, 319 SCIENCE 1238, 1238–40 (2008). 
 73.  For why it’s difficult to link biofuels mandates to precise measurements of deforestation, see 
Gao et al., supra note 3, at viii-ix, 2, 6-14, 26. 
 74.  Id. at 1. 
 75.  Id. at ix, 27. 
 76.  JAN WILLEM VAN GELDER & LAURA GERMAN, CIFOR, BIOFUEL FINANCE: GLOBAL TRENDS 
IN BIOFUEL FINANCE IN FOREST-RICH COUNTRIES OF ASIA, AFRICA AND LATIN AMERICA AND 
IMPLICATIONS FOR GOVERNANCE 3–4 (2011), available at http://www.cifor.org/publications 
/pdf_files/infobrief/3340-infobrief.pdf. 
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deforestation in Indonesia and Malaysia.77 CIFOR also identifies 
“emerging jatropha hotspots” that are likely to grow in future years, as the 
Introduction to this paper suggests.78 
Indirect land use changes (ILUCs) also occur: People need to eat, and 
thus when biofuels occupy land currently used to produce food, farmers 
must subsequently clear land elsewhere to grow displaced crops or graze 
displaced cattle.79  Various studies suggest that these ILUCs dramatically 
increase the ancillary GHG emissions caused by mandates meant to reduce 
GHGs; these ILUCs will also drive the unjust social consequences of lost 
food crops and local deforestation.80 
The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) estimates that 16% of 
citizens of developing countries—or about 850 million people—were 
undernourished during the years 2007-2009.81  Condon et al. note that 
“[f]uture food consumption trends in developing countries are particularly 
dependent upon how much corn is diverted to non-food uses.82 The OECD 
and FAO report that between 2007–2009, biofuels consumed 20% of sugar 
cane, 9% of vegetable oil and coarse grains, and 4% of sugar beets grown.83 
The US grows more than half of the world’s corn; although much of this 
goes to feed animals that are slaughtered for food,84 increasingly animal or 
human food crops shift to biofuel cultivation. 
It is not clear how much biofuel mandates have led to increasing food 
prices, and thus contributed to international environmental injustice.85  An 
influential FAO report traces shifts in farming from food to fuel crops, 
claiming this has increased the prices of food and exacerbated food scarcity 
in developing countries; farmers in these countries must then either clear 
more land to meet their food needs, or to meet the growing hunger for 
 
 77.  Gao et al., supra note 3, at ix, 271. 
 78.  Id. at 19. 
 79.  Id. at 22; TIMO KAPHENGST, ET AL., ECOLOGICAL BRIEFS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 20–21 (2012), available at http://www.ecologic.eu/files 
/publications/1358406689/kaphengst_12_Ecologic_Brief_Biofuel.pdf; David M. Lapola et al., Indirect 
Land-Use Change Can Overcome Carbon Savings from Biofuels in Brazil, 107 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. 
SCI. 3388, 3388 (2010). 
 80.  Gao, et al., supra note 3, at 24. 
 81.  FOOD & AGRIC. ORG., THE STATE OF FOOD INSECURITY IN THE WORLD 48 (2001), available 
at http://www.fao.org/docrep/018/i3434e/i3434e.pdf. 
 82.  See CONDON ET AL., supra note 58, at 2. 
 83.  ACTIONAID, FUEL FOR THOUGHT: ADDRESSING THE SOCIAL IMPACTS OF EU BIOFUELS 
POLICIES 5 (2012), available at http://www.actionaidusa.org/sites/files/actionaid/fuel_for_ thought.pdf. 
 84.  Economic Research Service: Trade, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., 
http://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/crops/corn/trade.aspx.  
 85.  Slating & Kesan, supra note 55, at 447–448. 
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biofuels to export.86 Ironically, such land clearing may result in overall net 
increases in GHG emission by releasing the carbon stored in forests and 
soils.87 
A comprehensive 2013 meta-analysis concludes that each additional 
billion gallons of ethanol production results in a 2–3% increase in corn 
prices over the long run, but a higher 5-10% increase using shorter time 
frames before markets and citizens adjust to changes in the law (and 
resulting changes in food supply).88  The analysis reviews how other 
studies connect biofuels mandates to food insecurity, and concludes that 
whatever the parameters of the various studies, “biofuels expansion will 
raise the number of people at risk of hunger or in poverty in developing 
countries.”89  Other studies find that global grain prices will increase 16–
35% by 2020 due to EU biofuels mandates.90 
Yet despite this evidence, neither the US nor the EU are paying 
attention to the distant, unjust results of biofuels mandates, as I will explain 
in the next section. 
 
SOCIAL IMPACT BIOFUELS MONITORING – OR LACK THEREOF 
 
Whatever the specific parameters of the unjust impacts turn out to be, 
the EU and the US are paying inadequate attention to the EJ consequences 
of their biofuels mandates.  Scholars sometimes overlook this, as well.  For 
example, in their otherwise thorough analysis of federal biofuel mandates, 
Timothy Slating and Jay Kesan review and comment on all proposed 
reforms of US biofuels laws.  Nothing in their review hints at any changes 
that would consider the developing world EJ impacts of biofuel mandates.91 
The US EPA requires “life cycle” analyses of biofuels, but only when 
assessing GHG emissions and other environmental impacts.  For example, 
in one analysis of feedstock, the EPA states that “[o]ur analysis of land use 
change GHG emissions includes an assessment of uncertainty that focuses 
on two aspects of indirect land use change—the types of land converted 
 
 86.  FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE U.N., HIGH-LEVEL CONFERENCE ON WORLD FOOD SECURITY: 
THE CHALLENGES OF CLIMATE CHANGE & BIOENERGY, SOARING FOOD PRICES: FACTS, PERSPECTIVES, 
IMPACTS, AND ACTIONS REQUIRED 4, 8, 16–31 (2008), available at 
ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/meeting/013/k2414e.pdf; U.N. ENV'T PROGRAMME, TOWARDS 
SUSTAINABLE PRODUCTION & USE OF RESOURCES: ASSESSING BIOFUELS 23, 63–64 (2009), available 
at http://www.unep.org/pdf/biofuels/Assessing_Biofuels_Full_Report.pdf [hereinafter UNEP]. 
 87.  Id. at 67–68. 
 88.  CONDON ET AL., supra note 58, at 2. 
 89.  Id. at 31. 
 90.  ACTIONAID, supra note 83, at 15. 
 91.  Slating & Kesan, supra note 55.  
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and the GHG emissions associated with different types of land 
converted.”92  While EJ impacts are mandated under this Symposium’s 
celebrated Executive Order 12898 to address Environmental Justice in 
Minority and Low-Income Populations in the US, the EPA’s life cycle 
assessment simply concludes: “EPA has determined that this rule will not 
have disproportionately high and adverse human health or environmental 
effects on minority or low-income populations because it does not affect 
the level of protection provided to human health or the environment.”93  
The EPA does not examine justice impacts beyond US borders. 
California’s Global Warming Solutions Act (AB 32) nods to EJ 
considerations, but those considerations do not extend across national 
borders.94  Regulators must look at “total potential costs and total potential 
economic and noneconomic benefits of the plan for reducing greenhouse 
gases to California’s economy, environment, and public health, using the 
best available economic models, emission estimation techniques, and other 
scientific methods.”95 Clearly that language does not consider anything 
outside of California.  Likewise, I find no mention of extraterritorial justice 
considerations in any California statute implementing the RPS.96 
The European Union has paid some attention to international 
environmental justice issues—but not that much.  The EU Renewable 
Energy Directive, (or “RED”) and the Fuel Quality Directive mandate that 
EU Member States create national policies promoting biofuels use.  The 
Renewable Energy Directive establishes a “20% target for the overall share 
of energy from renewable sources and a 10% target for energy from 
renewable sources in transport . . . .”97  The 20% target for renewable 
sources distinguishes between member states based on previous capacity 
for renewables, but each state must meet the 10% target for transport.98  
The 10% transport target does not per se mandate biofuels use,99 allowing 
the use of alternate energy savings by use of electric vehicles and other 
means. However, much of the legislation focuses on biofuels as the main 
 
 92.  Supplemental Determination for Renewable Fuels Produced Under the Final RFS2 Program 
From Grain Sorghum, 77 Fed. Reg. 74,592, 74,605 (Dec. 17, 2012). This language is repeated verbatim 
in other rulemakings. 
 93.  Id. at 74,603. 
 94.  CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38501(f) (West 2014). 
 95.  CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38561(d) (West 2014). 
 96.  See Cal. Exec. Order No. S-06-06; 2002 Cal. Stat. 1078 (introduced under Senate Bill 1078 in 
2002 and expanded in 2011, 2011 Cal. Stat. 2). 
 97.  2002 Cal. Stat. 1078. 
 98.  2002 Cal. Stat. 1078. 
 99.  Directive 2003/30/EC did mandate biofuel use, but was repealed by the RED. Council 
Directive 2009/28/EC, 2009 O.J. (L140) 16. 
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driver of the 10% target.100 
It is difficult to assess the land acreage that may have been cleared or 
repurposed to fulfill EU (or other national) biofuels requirements. The 2011 
Tirana conference of the International Land Coalition defined “land 
grabbing” as land acquisitions that are in violation of human rights, without 
prior consent of the preexisting land users, and with no consideration of the 
social and environmental impacts.101 The NGO ActionAid estimates a total 
at least 50 million hectares of biofuels land grabs.102 Another report 
estimates that 13 to 19 million hectares will be required to fulfill EU 
biofuels mandates by 2020.103  In a report on “[l]and grabs for biofuels 
driven by EU biofuels policies,” Ecofys, a sustainable energy consulting 
firm, offered a more sober assessment of 1.8 million hectares currently 
“grabbed for biofuels,” of which 180,000 hectares derived from EU 
biofuels mandates.104 Thus even the most conservative estimates point to 
extensive diversion of land from crops and forests to biofuels cultivation. 
In addition, the aviation industry is now embracing biofuels to avoid 
price fluctuations from traditional fuels, to promote a greener image to 
consumers, and to meet EU (and other) GHG reduction mandates.105  The 
European Advanced Biofuel Flightpath joins the European Commission 
with airlines including KLM and Lufthansa to make available 2.5 billion 
liters of aviation biofuel by 2020; this is over and above that required by 
the EU RED.  Experts estimate this would require 3.5 million hectares of 
land.106 To meet a stated 2050 target would take 13.6 million barrels of 
biofuel each day which is nearly all the biofuels for all uses predicted to be 
available at that time.107  The controversial EU Emissions Trading System 
requires all airplanes flying in and out of EU airports to reduce their GHG 
emissions; plant based aviation biofuels count as carbon neutral, thus 
 
 100.  The savings must come from “all forms of transport.” See Council Directive 2009/28/EC art. 
3, 2009 O.J. (L140) 16. (emphasis added). 
 101.  Maria C. Rulli et al., Global Water and Land Grabbing, 110 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 892, 
892 (2013). 
 102.  CARLO HAMELINCK, ECOFYS, LAND GRABS FOR BIOFUELS DRIVEN BY EU BIOFUELS 
POLICIES 10 (2013), available at http://www.ecofys.com/files/files/ecofys-2013-report-on-land-
grabbing-for-biofuels.pdf. See also ACTIONAID, supra note 83, at 1. 
 103.  UK RENEWABLE FUELS AGENCY, THE GALLAGHER REVIEW OF THE INDIRECT EFFECTS OF 
BIOFUELS PRODUCTION 32 (2008). 
 104.  HAMELINCK, supra note 102, at iv. 
 105.  See OAKLAND INSTITUTE, ECO-SKIES: THE GLOBAL RUSH FOR AVIATION BIOFUEL 16 (2013), 
available at http://www.oaklandinstitute.org/sites/oaklandinstitute.org/files/OI_Report _Eco-Skies.pdf 
[hereinafter Eco-Skies]. 
 106.  FRIENDS OF THE EARTH EUROPE, FLYING IN THE FACE OF FACTS: GREENWASHING THE 
AVIATION INDUSTRY WITH BIOFUELS 9 (2011). 
 107.  For an overview, see Eco-Skies, supra note 105, at 16.  
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further incentivizing biofuels cultivation for aviation.108 
Even at the low end of the estimates of acreage required to fulfill 
biofuel mandates, acquiring land can have devastating effects on local 
communities in the developing world, causing land dispossession, food 
insecurity, water depletion and abusive labor practices.109 ActionAid 
provides bleak case studies of ruined lives and broken promises in Kenya, 
Tanzania, and Guatemala from plantations meant to export crops for 
biofuels to the EU.110  For example, in Kenya, an Italian company seeking 
to grow jatropha tried to lease 50,000 ha, potentially displacing 20,000 
people, but the communities managed to oust the company.111  In 
Guatemala, the national army evicted hundreds of families to make way for 
a sugar plantation to fuel the EU biofuels market.112  In Tanzania, a British 
company convinced communities to give up collective rights to land they 
used to farm, graze livestock and harvest forest products. When the 
subsequent corporate biofuels venture went bankrupt, the community was 
left poorer and had lost their traditional land rights; security guards block 
their access to their traditional lands.113 
Some developing nations are implementing policies to govern biofuels 
land grabs.  For example, nine African nations have instituted specific 
policies, and 14 others are developing policies.114  Implementing and 
enforcing those policies may be difficult, given the many challenges facing 
these nations, and given the comparative strength of transnational actors 
driven by a strong profit motive.  As I will discuss in the next section, 
Northern nations must pay greater attention to EJ impacts when writing and 
implementing biofuel laws. 
 
 
 
 
 
 108.  Biofuels are Essential to Reducing EU ETS Carbon Costs and Meeting Carbon-Neutral 
Growth Goals, Says Report, GREENAIRONLINE (Feb. 16, 2010), http://www.greenaironline. 
com/news.php?viewStory=1135. 
 109.  Consolidated RSB EU Red Principles & Criteria for Sustainable Biofuel Production, 
Roundtable on Sustainable Biofuels at 24, available at http://rsbservices.org/wordpress/wp-
content/uploads/2012/10/RSB-PC-V2.pdf. See also generally OXFAM INT’L, LAND AND POWER: THE 
GROWING SCANDAL SURROUNDING THE NEW WAVE OF INVESTMENTS IN LAND (2011). 
 110.  ACTIONAID, supra note 83, at 7–9.  
 111.  See id. at 25. 
 112.  See id. at 27. 
 113.  OAKLAND INSTITUTE, TANZANIAN VILLAGERS PAY FOR SUN BIOFUELS INVESTMENT 
DISASTER, LAND DEAL BRIEF 1 (2012). 
 114.  HAMELINCK, supra note 102, at 11. 
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CRITERIA FOR JUSTICE IN BIOFUELS MANDATE HAVENS 
 
The EU calls for “sustainability” criteria when implementing biofuels 
mandates, but has named little in the way of specific social or 
environmental criteria. Member nations are encouraged, though not 
required, to enter into agreements with non-EU nations regarding oversight 
of the sustainability criteria.115  The EU’s official Directive expresses 
concern over the growing need for agricultural commodities and warns 
against “net increase in cropped area” for biofuels; but the concern is 
expressed in the context of unaccounted for GHG increases, and does not 
express similar concern for social dislocations.116 The Directive’s articles 
pertaining to sustainability are primarily concerned with maintaining 
ecological sustainability, but do refer in passing to a required biennial 
report that includes, inter alia, “the impact of Community biofuel policy on 
the availability of foodstuffs at affordable prices, in particular for people 
living in developing countries, and wider development issues.  Reports 
shall address the respect of land-use rights.  They shall state, both for third 
countries and Member States that are a significant source of raw material 
for biofuel consumed within the Community whether the country has 
ratified and Implemented” a list of ILO Conventions, as well as the 
Cartegena Protocol on Biosafety and Convention on International Trade in 
Endangered Species.117 
The criteria do specify that biodiverse lands should not be converted 
to growing biofuels crops: 
The increasing worldwide demand for biofuels and bioliquids, and the 
incentives for their use provided for in this Directive, should not have the 
effect of encouraging the destruction of biodiverse lands. Those finite 
resources, recognised in various international instruments to be of value to 
all mankind, should be preserved. Consumers in the Community would, in 
addition, find it morally unacceptable that their increased use of biofuels 
and bioliquids could have the effect of destroying biodiverse lands. For 
these reasons, it is necessary to provide sustainability criteria ensuring that 
biofuels and bioliquids can qualify for the incentives only when it can be 
guaranteed that they do not originate in biodiverse areas or, in the case of 
areas designated for nature protection purposes or for the protection of rare, 
threatened or endangered ecosystems or species, the relevant competent 
authority demonstrates that the production of the raw material does not 
 
 115.  Council Directive 2009/28/EC, art. 18, 2009 O.J. (L140) 16. 
 116.  Council Directive 2009/28/EC, 2009 O.J. (L140) 16. 
 117.  Id. 
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interfere with those purposes.118 
It might be morally unacceptable to destroy biodiverse lands (a 
sentiment with which I agree), but moral unacceptability does not yet 
extend explicitly to the social implications of biofuels mandates.  Even 
here, the concern is for nonhuman lives, and not the humans that co-depend 
upon the land. 
The European Commission’s (EC) own required biennial 2012 
progress report includes the social sustainability report required by article 
17(7) of the RED, but devotes little analysis to this issue.119 The Report 
estimates that 2.4 million hectares were used for feedstock crops outside 
the EU to meet 2010 biofuels use.  60% of the feedstock for biofuels are 
grown in the EU, with Argentina, Indonesia, Brazil, the US, and others 
supplying the rest.120 Argentina, Indonesia, Malaysia, China, and the US 
were the top biodiesel providers.121 
The progress report devotes a total of one paragraph to “social 
sustainability,” concluding that “it is not yet clear if EU biofuels demand 
contributes any abuse of land rights.” But noting that recent years have 
seen global food prices increase, “Commission and Member States’ 
monitoring of this issue must, however, continue.”122  The EC notes that 
while most countries producing the fuels have ratified labor and other 
conventions noted in Article 17, enforcement is lax.123 The Commission 
hints that “there are some gaps” in biofuel environmental sustainability 
criteria, but notes that 13 “voluntary schemes” have been approved.124 The 
section also notes that biofuels have created 1.4 million global jobs, but 
provide no reference for this figure, and does not discuss what or who was 
displaced when land was converted to biofuels cultivation.125  Member 
States are required to report on fulfillment of the Directive, but few EU 
member states have attended to the sustainability criteria, and the voluntary 
schemes126 adopted by some member states have lax verification.127 For 
 
 118.  Id. 
 119.  RENEWABLE ENERGY PROGRESS REPORT:  REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE 
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE 
COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS 11 (2013), available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2013:0175:FIN:EN:PDF. 
 120.  Id. at 15. Feedstock also came from Canada, Ukraine, Malaysia, Paraguay, Russia, China, 
Switzerland, Peru, Egypt, Guatemala and “other.” Id. at 11. 
 121.  Id. at 11. 
 122.  Id. at 11–12. 
 123.  Id. at 12. 
 124.  Id. at 11–12. 
 125.  Id. at 12. 
 126.  Of these voluntary schemes, approved by the EU, few have social criteria, and do not include 
the most popular ones. KAPHENGST ET AL., supra note 79, at 20–21. 
DT edits Takacs Author Proof Nov 2014 (Do Not Delete) 12/4/2014  7:12 PM 
Spring 2014] AVOIDING MANDATE HAVENS 337 
example, Germany says little about protections for non-EU land rights, and 
in its report had no plan to enter into agreements with non-EU nations 
regarding sustainability and social issues.128 
The European Parliament is considering amending the biofuels 
mandate to pay more attention to international EJ.  One amendment under 
consideration proposes that biofuels “shall not be made from land-based 
raw material unless third parties’ legal rights regarding use and tenure of 
the land are respected, inter alia by obtaining the free prior and informed 
consent of the third parties, with the involvement of their representative 
institutions.”129  Another Amendment proposes a biennial report “on the 
impact on social sustainability in the Union and in third countries of 
increased demand for biofuel on the contribution of biofuel production to 
reducing the Union’s shortage of vegetable protein and on the impact of 
Union biofuel policy on the availability of foodstuffs at affordable prices, in 
particular for people [. . .] in developing countries, and [. . .] wider 
development issues.”130  These requirements have not yet gone into effect; 
it is not clear that they ever will. 
As noted above, various companies have derived voluntary schemes 
that would help a biofuels operator comply with EU-mandated social 
sustainability criteria.  A study by the World Wildlife Fund suggested that 
most of the standards approved to certify “sustainability” under the EU 
RED requirements were not truly sustainable.  The “best-performing” 
scheme was the Roundtable on Sustainable Biomaterials (RSB) standard.131  
Indeed, RSB has the most aggressive social sustainability criteria of 
 
 127.  COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT:  REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE 
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL 17 (2013), available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=SWD:2013:0102:FIN:EN:PDF.  
 128.  FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, NATIONALER AKTIONSPLAN FU ̈R ERNEUERBARE ENERGIE 
GEMA ̈ß DER RICHTLINIE 2009/28/EG ZUR FO ̈RDERUNG DER NUTZUNG VON ENERGIE AUS 
ERNEUERBAREN QUELLEN [NATIONAL RENEWABLE ENERGY ACTION PLAN IN ACCORDANCE WITH 
DIRECTIVE 2009/28/EC ON THE PROMOTION OF THE USE OF ENERGY FROM RENEWABLE SOURCES] 63 
(2010), available at http://ec.europa.eu/energy/renewables/ action_plan_en.htm. 
 129.  Amendment 49 to Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
amending Directive 98/70/EC (2013) COM (2012) 0595 (Sept. 11, 2013), available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P7-TA-2013-
0357+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN Commission. 
 130.  Amendment 50 to Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
amending Directive 98/70/EC (2013) COM (2012) 0595 (Sept. 11, 2013), available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P7-TA-2013-
0357+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN Commission (italics and ellipses in the original). 
 131.  Europe’s Biofuels Not Guaranteed Sustainable, Finds New Study, WWF (Nov. 28, 2013), 
http://wwf.panda.org/what_we_do/footprint/climate_carbon_energy/energy_solutions22/ 
renewable_energy/sustainable_energy_report/?212777/europes-biofuels-not-guaranteed-sustainable-
finds-new-study. 
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standards that Ecologic,a respected research institute, (and I) reviewed.  
Several of the acceptable standards had no social sustainability criteria.132  
Only RSB demands Free, Prior, and Informed Consent to “form the basis 
for the process to be followed during all stakeholder consultation, which 
shall be gender sensitive and result in consensus-driven negotiated 
agreements.”133  Only the RSB standards forbid involuntary resettlement.134  
RSB also offers the broadest protections for sustaining and enhancing food 
security, and is the only standard requiring long-term commitments to the 
community in which a biofuels enterprise operates.135 
Nonetheless, at the time of a comprehensive examination of EU 
sustainability schemes in 2012, only one enterprise had chosen RSB 
(compared, e.g., to 934 that had chosen a single competitor that had much 
less rigorous social criteria).136 This review warns of “the threat for a ‘race 
to the bottom’ in social requirements,” as entities requiring certification 
will seek the business with the lowest standards that nonetheless meet the 
EU’s sustainability requirements.137  Paying attention to International EJ 
when designing domestic policies may, however, price a mandate haven 
out of the market.138 
Some might argue that deleterious impacts in the South are simply 
unintended international EJ consequences of an environmental mandate. 
How unintended are these consequences, really?  When legislators fail to 
acknowledge the unjust impacts of their laws – even after years of data 
support findings of injustice – at some point we must consider that 
governments intend to perpetuate injustice. Certainly, for example, the US 
would require some justice criteria, and the EU would require the strictest 
of the standards that have been proposed (the RSB standard), or something 
even stricter.  Ideally, they would adopt an EU-wide standard that 
delineates the standard, and any private verifiers would have to meet those 
standards if a project or a national scheme were to be certified. 
 
 132.  KAPHENGST ET AL., supra note 79, at 19–20.  
 133.  ROUNDTABLE ON SUSTAINABLE BIOFUELS, ENERGY CENTER OF ÉCOLE POLYTECHNIQUE 
FÉDÉRALE DE LAUSANNE, CONSOLIDATED RSB EU RED PRINCIPLES &CRITERIA FOR SUSTAINABLE 
BIOFUEL PRODUCTION  9 (2011), available at http://rsbservices.org/wordpress/wp-
content/uploads/2012/10/RSB-PC-V2.pdf.  For a review of FPIC, see David Takacs, supra note 16. 
 134.  KAPHENGST ET AL., supra note 79, at 21; ROUNDTABLE ON SUSTAINABLE BIOFUELS, supra 
note 133, at 30. 
 135.  KAPHENGST ET AL., supra note 79, at 21–22; ROUNDTABLE ON SUSTAINABLE BIOFUELS, 
supra note 133, at 9, 17. 
 136.  KAPHENGST ET AL., supra note 79, at 20. 
 137.  Id. at 24. 
 138.  Takacs, supra note 46, at 721; Gloria Gonzalez, For REDD Proponents, No Regrets Despite 
Policy, Finance Challenges, ECOSYSTEMS MARKETPLACE, http://www.ecosystem marketplace.com/ 
pages/dynamic/article.page.php?page_id=10074&section=news_articles&eod=1 (Nov. 26, 2013). 
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Despite protests to the contrary, it is difficult to envision how biofuel 
cultivation in the developing world can ever promote sustainable 
development and just lives.  Some sources promote biofuels as a win-win-
win for all stakeholders.  Not only do Northern governments improve their 
energy security and reduce GHG emissions, but promoters say biofuels 
cultivation provides a source of jobs and/or income for Southern rural 
citizens.139 Before it went bankrupt, Sun Biofuels, for example, promoted 
its biofuels ventures that would “bring welfare to what are often 
disadvantaged communities.”140 
In a Report titled “Rising Global Interest in Farmland: Can it Yield 
Sustainable and Equitable Benefits?” the World Bank responds with a 
cautious “yes.” While recognizing that biofuels pose risks to the developing 
world, the World Bank nonetheless believes with careful attention, biofuels 
actors can “minimize risks and capitalize on opportunities to contribute to 
poverty reduction and economic growth, especially in rural areas.”141  The 
World Bank and others have produced “Principles for Responsible 
Agricultural Investment that Respect Rights, Livelihoods and Resources.” 
The seven principles for (as a group of activist organizations describe it, 
“‘win-win’ land grabbing”: 
1. Land and resource rights: Existing rights to land and natural 
resources are recognised and respected. 
2. Food security: Investments do not jeopardise food security, but 
rather strengthen it. 
3. Transparency, good governance and enabling environment: 
Processes for accessing land and making associated investments are 
transparent, monitored, and ensure accountability. 
4. Consultation and participation: Those materially affected are 
consulted and agreements from consultations are recorded and 
enforced. 
5. Economic viability and responsible agro-enterprise investing: 
Projects are viable in every sense, respect the rule of law, reflect 
industry best practice, and result in durable shared value. 
6. Social sustainability: Investments generate desirable social and 
distributional impacts and do not increase vulnerability. 
7. Environmental sustainability: Environmental impacts are quantified 
and measures taken to encourage sustainable resource use, while 
 
 139.  See generally OAKLAND INSTITUTE, supra note 113, at 5. 
 140. Id. at 5 (Sun Biofuels website no longer active). 
 141.  KLAUS DEININGER ET AL., RISING GLOBAL INTEREST IN FARMLAND: CAN IT YIELD 
SUSTAINABLE AND EQUITABLE BENEFITS? xxvi (2011), available at http://siteresources 
.worldbank.org/INTARD/Resources/ESW_Sept7_final_final.pdf. 
DT edits Takacs Author Proof Nov 2014 (Do Not Delete) 12/4/2014  7:12 PM 
340 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol. XXIV:315 
minimising and mitigating the negative impact.142 
If operationalized in rigorous, verifiable criteria, these principles 
might be a good place to start.  But should we start at all?  A network of 
international activists representing 130 groups has denounced these 
principles, asserting that it is unjust to usurp any rural farmlands for food or 
biofuels.143  The UN’s Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food called these 
principles “woefully inadequate;”144 The World Bank’s own researchers 
could not find examples of win-win results for rural communities as a 
result of land grabbing.145 
It is conceivable that land grabbing in the South to fulfill Northern 
biofuel mandates could result in lower GHG emissions – and thus 
contribute to greater environmental justice through slowing climate 
change’s onset and impacts. But unlike REDD+, whose operations may 
sustain local functioning ecosystems and allow continued usufruct use of 
forests, cultivating biofuels will inevitably replace farm lands or 
functioning forests with industrial monocrops.  Rural citizens may gain 
employment, but it will likely be to the expense of their own ability to 
gather and grow food, to their detriment.  Biofuels mandates bring dubious 
GHG reduction calculations that neglect ILUCs and transport costs, 
coupled with the current and future appropriation of land and water 
desperately needed by rural citizens of the global South, coupled with the 
local pollution that corporate monoculture agriculture brings, as well as 
alleged harsh labor conditions at energy crop plantations.146 No amount of 
sustainability principles—even if rigorously verified on the ground (itself a 
dubious proposition)—is going to prevent greater environmental injustices 
stemming from continued ambitious Northern biofuel quotas that require 
Southern land to fulfill.147 
Unlike REDD+, whose operations may sustain local functioning 
 
 142.  Principles for Responsible Agricultural Investment (RAI) that Respects Rights, Livelihoods 
and Resources: Principle 7, KNOWLEDGE EXCHANGE PLATFORM FOR RAI, 
https://www.responsibleagroinvestment.org/node/248 (last visited Feb. 23, 2004). 
 143.  Land Research Action Network, Stop Land Grabbing Now!! Say NO to the Principles on 
Responsible Agro-Enterprise Investment Promoted by the World Bank, LANDACTION.ORG (Apr. 12, 
2010), http://www.landaction.org/spip.php?article499. 
 144.    Olivier de Schutter, Responsibly Destroying the World’s Peasantry, PROJECT SYNDICATE 
(June 4, 2010), http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/deschutter1/English. 
 145.  Via Campesina et al., It’s Time to Outlaw Land Grabbing, Not to Make it ‘Responsible’!, 
GRAIN.ORG (Apr. 17, 2011), http://www.grain.org/article/entries/4227-it-s-time-to-outlaw-land-
grabbing-not-to-make-it-responsible. 
 146.  KAPHENGST ET AL., supra note 79, at 7, 20–21.  
 147.  UNESCO estimates that 2% of water used for irrigation is for energy crops. See THE UN 
WORLD WATER DEVELOPMENT REPORT 3: WATER IN A CHANGING WORLD 10 (2008), available at 
http://www.unesco.org/new/fileadmin/MULTIMEDIA/HQ/SC/pdf/WWDR3_Facts_ and_Figures.pdf. 
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ecosystems and allow continued usufruct use of forests, biofuels cultivation 
usually replaces cultivated lands or functioning forests with industrial 
monocrops.  Rural citizens may gain employment, but it will likely be to 
the expense of their own ability to gather and grow food, to their detriment. 
Responding to negative publicity, private companies are taking action 
to ameliorate injustice.  For example, when nearly a quarter million people 
took part in Oxfam’s campaign exhorting food and beverage companies to 
respect land rights,148 Coca-Cola declared that “land grabbing is 
unacceptable.”  It commits to “third-party social, environmental and human 
rights assessments” for the top countries from which its sugar cane is 
supplied and making transparent from which companies and nations its 
supply chain stems, making it easier for third parties to monitor 
compliance.  As part of its “zero tolerance for land grabbing,” Coca-Cola 
pledges to adhere to the principle of Free, Prior, and Informed Consent, and 
to commit to 100% sustainable sourcing of cane sugar by 2020.149 
Under the label of the “Sustainable Aviation Fuel Users Group” 
various airlines representing 32% of fuel demand pledged that “[j]et fuel 
plant sources should be developed in a manner which is non-competitive 
with food and where biodiversity impacts are minimized; in addition, the 
cultivation of those plant sources should not jeopardize water supplies.”150 
Furthermore, “development projects should include provisions for 
outcomes that improve socioeconomic conditions for small-scale farmers 
who rely on agriculture to feed them and their families, and that do not 
require the involuntary displacement of local populations.”151  The group is 
working with other organizations to develop standards and promote peer-
reviewed research on best practices.152 
These kinds of commitments should not be merely voluntary; they 
should be legally mandated, and incorporated into all Northern domestic 
legislation promoting biofuels. 
In the next section on REDD+, I will discuss how forest carbon offsets 
 
 148.  The Coca-Cola Company Declares “Zero Tolerance” for Land Grabs in Supply Chain, 
OXFAM CAMPAIGNS (Nov. 8, 2013), http://www.oxfam.org/en/grow/pressroom/pressrelease/ 2013-11-
08/coca-cola-company-declares-zero-tolerance-land-grabs-supply-chain. 
 149.  The Coca-Cola Company Commitment: Land Rights and Sugar, COCA-COLACOMPANY.COM, 
http://assets.coca-colacompany.com/6b/65/7f0d386040fcb4872fa136 f05c5c/proposal-to-oxfam-on-
land-tenure-and-sugar.pdf (last visited Feb. 23, 2013). 
 150.  Back to Initiatives & Projects List, INT’L CIVIL AVIATION ORG., 
http://www.icao.int/environmental-protection/GFAAF/Pages/Project.aspx?ProjectID=13 (last visited 
Apr. 6, 2014). 
 151.  Susanne Retka Schill, Aviation Group Forms to Support Sustainable Biofuels, BIOMASS 
MAG., http://biomassmagazine.com/articles/2077/aviation-group-forms-to-support-sustainable-biofuels. 
 152.  Our Commitment to Sustainable Options, SUSTAINABLE AVIATION FUEL USERS GRP., 
http://www.safug.org/safug-pledge/ (last visited Apr. 6, 2014). 
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may, if done with rigorous attention to rigorous standards, lead to a more 
environmentally just world.  Those social sustainability criteria begin with 
the recognition that actions taken to reduce Northern GHG footprints must 
take into account the social impacts of those actions in places otherwise out 
of sight and mind. 
 
REDD+: CLIMATE CHANGE MANDATE HAVENS 
THAT CAN ACTUALLY MAKE FOR A MORE  
ENVIRONMENTALLY JUST WORLD – OR NOT 
 
Programs in Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest 
Degradation—or REDD+ —present another example of potential climate 
change mandate havens.  REDD+ programs have attracted over $5 billion 
dollars in pledged or spent funds from the United Nations, international 
financial institutions, companies looking for GHG offsets, national and 
subnational governments, environmental and social welfare NGOs, and 
private citizens.153  In a REDD+ project or program, an individual 
landowner, local community, private developer, or government entity 
reforests degraded land or pledges to preserve a forest that would otherwise 
be felled.154  They may then sell the sequestered carbon for a contracted 
period of time to entities that want to offset their GHG emissions (either 
because they are legally mandated to do so or they are voluntarily reducing 
their climate change footprint) or simply wants to fund forest 
preservation.155  REDD+ happens on a project-by-project basis, where a 
developer contracts with landowners to preserve or reforest land, and sells 
the stored carbon.  Alternatively, nations, states, or provinces implement 
REDD+ on a broader, “jurisdictional” scale, i.e., they use REDD+ funds to 
reduce deforestation or promote reforestation in a broad geographic area, 
resulting in greater stored carbon than would have occurred absent the 
 
 153.  See MOLLY PETERS-STANLEY ET AL., FOREST TRENDS INITIATIVE, COVERING NEW GROUND: 
STATE OF THE FOREST CARBON MARKETS 2013 vii (2013), available at http://www.forest-
trends.org/documents/files/SOFCM-full-report.pdf; see also ANNA CREED, THE PRINCE’S RAINFORESTS 
PROJECT,  EMERGENCY FINANCE FOR TROPICAL FORESTS: TWO YEARS ON: IS INTERIM REDD+ 
FINANCE BEING DELIVERED AS NEEDED? 7–10 (2011), available at http://www.pcfisu.org/wp-
content/uploads/2011/11/Two-years-on_Is-interim-REDD+-Finance-being-delivered-as-needed.pdf. 
 154.  Lisa Hayden, So What is REDD, Anyway?, PLANET CHANGE (Dec. 8,2010), 
http://change.nature.org/2010/12/08/so-what-is-redd-anyway/. Also falling under REDD+’s aegis: 
programs to improve forest management, improve agriculture to retain soil carbon, and preserve 
peatlands. About REDD+, UN-REDD PROGRAMME, http://www.un-
redd.org/AboutREDD/tabid/102614/Default.aspx (last visited Feb. 23, 2013). See generally CREED, 
supra note 153; PETERS-STANLEY ET AL., supra note 153. 
 155.  See David J. Kelly, The Case for Social Safeguards in a Post-2012 Agreement on REDD, 6 L. 
ENV’T & DEV. J. 61, 67 (2010); see also TAKACS, supra note 17, at 10. 
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funding.156 
Terrestrial plants absorb about a quarter of the CO2 that humans emit; 
deforestation accounts for somewhere between 15-32% of GHG 
emissions.157 REDD+ mitigates climate change when trees retain carbon 
that deforestation or forest degradation would otherwise release.  
Furthermore, preserving forests helps preserve the planet’s dwindling 
supply of fully functioning ecosystems that support a trove of 
biodiversity.158 
REDD+ may greatly contribute to a deeply equitable world; it offers a 
chance to institute legal reforms that preserve the planet’s biodiversity, 
mitigate the planet’s human poverty, and innovate the way developed and 
developing nations incentivize sound methods of sustainable living for a 
sustainable planet. Intact forests help rural communities adapt to climate 
change by sustaining ecosystem services that purify water, increase rainfall, 
prevent erosion, buffer floods, and harbor crop pollinators.159  REDD+ may 
 
 156.  For an overview of California’s possible REDD+ offsets program, reference REDD OFFSET 
WORKING GROUP, CALIFORNIA, ACRE AND CHIAPAS: PARTNERING TO REDUCE EMISSIONS FROM 
TROPICAL DEFORESTATION (Evan Johnson ed., 2013), available at 
http://greentechleadership.org/documents/2013/07/row-final-recommendations-2.pdf; IPAM 
INTERNATIONAL PROGRAM, ELECTRIC POWER RESEARCH INSTITUTE, OVERVIEW OF SUBNATIONAL 
PROGRAMS TO REDUCE EMISSIONS FROM DEFORESTATION AND FOREST DEGRADATION (REDD) AS 
PART OF THE GOVERNORS’ CLIMATE AND FOREST TASK FORCE 1-1–1-5 (2012), available at 
http://www.gcftaskforce.org/documents/EPRI.pdf; SAUNDERS ET AL.; PROFOREST, REDUCED 
EMISSIONS FROM DEFORESTATION AND FOREST DEGRADATION: LESSONS FROM A FOREST 
GOVERNANCE PERSPECTIVE 4 (2008). 
 157.  REDD OFFSET WORKING GROUP supra note 156, at 10; CGIAR RESEARCH PROGRAM ON 
CLIMATE CHANGE, AGRICULTURE AND FOOD SECURITY, BIG FACTS ON CLIMATE CHANGE, 
AGRICULTURE AND FOOD SECURITY, available at http://ccafs.cgiar.org/bigfacts/global-agriculture-
emissions; Valerie Volcovici, A Slow Start for the Carbon Credit Market, N.Y. TIMES (July 24, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/25/business/energy-environment/a-slow-start-for-the-for-carbon-
credit-market.html?pagewanted=all; KEVIN WATKINS, U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME, HUMAN 
DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2007/2008: FIGHTING CLIMATE CHANGE: HUMAN SOLIDARITY IN A DIVIDED 
WORLD 2007 1, 40–41 (2007), available at http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/ 
reports/268/hdr_20072008_en_complete.pdf (noting that deforestation accounts for between 11 and 28 
percent of total carbon dioxide emissions); American Clean Energy and Security Act, H.R. Res. 2454, 
111th Cong. § 752(2) (2009); Gleb Raygorodetsky, Can REDD Ever Become Green, OUR WORLD 
(Aug. 1, 2012), http://ourworld.unu.edu/en/can-redd-ever-become-green/; Robert J. Carpenter, 
Implementation of Biological Sequestration Offsets in a Carbon Reduction Policy: Answers to Key 
Questions for a Successful Domestic Offset Program, 31 ENERGY L.J. 157, 158 (2010). 
 158.  United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Nov. 28–Dec. 11, 2011, 
Outcome of the Work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action Under the 
Convention, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.1 14-15 (Mar. 15, 2011).  
 159.  VALERIE CAPOS ET AL., U.N. ENVTL. PROGRAMME, REDUCING EMISSIONS FROM 
DEFORESTATION: A KEY OPPORTUNITY FOR ATTAINING MULTIPLE BENEFITS 9–10 (2007); Stefano 
Pagiola et al., Market-Based Mechanisms for Forest Conservation and Development in SELLING 
FOREST ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES: MARKET-BASED MECHANISMS FOR CONSERVATION AND 
DEVELOPMENT 2 (Stefano Pagiola et al. eds., 2002); David Freestone, Foreword to CLIMATE CHANGE 
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also provide new sources of income and stability through direct payments 
for preserving forests, and by teaching new forestry-related skills,160 or by 
providing for more secure, formal land title.161 REDD+ may promote 
greater institutional adaptation through enhanced democratic participation 
as community leaders, landowners, and local government officials develop 
and manage REDD+ projects and hone skills and institutions to negotiate 
effectively with project developers and government functionaries.162 
However, REDD+, if done poorly—i.e. if project managers do not 
focus on EJ—may exacerbate environmental injustice. I have criticized 
REDD+, analyzing the injustices wrought by early projects, enumerating 
equitable principles for REDD+ that are difficult to achieve, and describing 
 
AND FORESTS: EMERGING POLICY AND MARKET OPPORTUNITIES ix, xii (Charlotte Streck et al. eds., 
2008); THE CERSPA INITIATIVE, CERTIFIED EMISSIONS REDUCTION SALE AND PURCHASE AGREEMENT 
GUIDANCE DOCUMENT (2009), available at http://www.cerspa.com. 
 160.  See Richard Tipper, Helping Indigenous Farmers to Participate in the International Market 
for Carbon Services: The Case of Scolel Té, in SELLING FOREST ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES: MARKET-
BASED MECHANISMS FOR CONSERVATION AND DEVELOPMENT 223, 232 (Stefano Pagiola et al. eds., 
2002); Margaret Skutsch et al., Alternative Models for Carbon Payments to Communities under 
REDD+: A Comparison Using the Polis Model of Actor Inducements, 14 ENVTL. SCI. & POL’Y 140, 
143 (2011); Promode Kant, REDD Should Create Jobs, Not Merely Bring Compensation 3 (Inst. of 
Green Econ., Working Paper No. 13, 2010), available at http://www.igrec.in/REDD_ 
should_create_Jobs_Not_merely_bring_compensation.pdf; International Workshop in Mexico Explores 
the Role of Local Communities in REDD+ MRV, FOREST CARBON P’SHIP FACILITY, 
http://www.forestcarbonpartnership.org/international-workshop-mexico-explores-role-local-
communities-redd-mrv (last visited Feb. 24, 2014). 
 161.  See TAKACS, supra note 17, at 53–57; Ashwini Chhatre et al., Social Safeguards and Co-
Benefits in REDD+: A Review of the Adjacent Possible, 4 CURRENT OPINION IN ENVTL. 
SUSTAINABILITY 654, 655 (2012) (suggesting that increased land security for local communities, 
combined with effective participation in land management, can prevent adverse social impacts of 
REDD+ and better achieve environmental and climate objectives); see KATOOMBA GROUP ET AL., 
PAYMENTS FOR ECOSYSTEM SERVICES: GETTING STARTED 10 (2008), available at 
http://www.katoombagroup.org/documents/publications/GettingStarted.pdf; WILLIAM D. SUNDERLIN ET 
AL., RIGHTS & RES. INITIATIVE, FROM EXCLUSION TO OWNERSHIP? CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES 
IN ADVANCING FOREST TENURE REFORM 29–30 (2008) (noting that community based land ownership 
can prevent land appropriation by outside developers); Carina Bracer et al., Organization and 
Governance for Fostering Pro-Poor Compensation for Environmental Services 35–36 (World 
Agroforestry Ctr., Working Paper No. 39, 2007), available at http://www.worldagroforestry 
.org/downloads/publications/PDFs/wp14961.pdf; Julian Quan & Nat Dyer, Climate Change and Land 
Tenure: The Implications of Climate Change for Land Tenure and Land Policy 52 (Int’l Inst. for Env’t 
& Dev. and Natural Res. Inst., Univ. of Greenwich, Land Tenure Working Paper No. 2, 2008), 
available at ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/011/aj332e/aj332e00.pdf. 
 162.  Chhatre et al., supra note 161, at 657; Patricia Nelson, An African Dimension to the Clean 
Development Mechanism: Finding a Path to Sustainable Development in the Energy Sector, 32 DENV. 
J. INT'L. L. & POL'Y 615, 623 (2004) (discussing how sustainable development is considered by 
Africans to necessitate institutionalization of balanced growth practices); Alfred Ofosu-Ahenkorah, 
CDM Participation and Credit Pricing in Africa, in EQUAL EXCHANGE: DETERMINING A FAIR PRICE 
FOR CARBON 127, 133 (Glenn Hodes & Sami Kamel eds., 2007), available at 
http://cd4cdm.org/Publications/Perspectives/FairPriceCarbon.pdf. 
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the formidable set of legal issues for allocating forest carbon as property.163  
REDD+ may fail to mitigate global climate change, and instead may 
violate human rights, undercut democracy, and may create a pressure valve 
that permits developed citizens’ unjust, GHG-polluting habits to go 
unabated, allowing the already rich (mostly in the global North) to assuage 
their consciences and actually profit at the expense of the poor (in the 
global South) they are allegedly aiding.164  At the same time, REDD+ may 
exacerbate inequities as it exacts high opportunity costs: local people and 
national governments may be barred from using forests to generate profits 
(e.g. through logging) or to sustain local communities (e.g. through 
conversion to agricultural land or harvesting trees for building material).165 
Yes, REDD+ can be criticized on multiple levels, not least of which it 
is a neoliberal response to an ethical/equity problem, and not least is that it 
is a top down set of laws and policies promulgated in the global North, 
based upon Northern laws and notions of contract and property.  
Nonetheless, it does have important lessons to teach us – both cautionary 
tales, and ways forward to how to account for EJ issues that intentionally or 
unintentionally arise from domestic responses to environmental 
degradation. But developing nations are not suddenly going to set the 
procedural or substantive terms of the agenda, and the North isn’t going to 
suddenly own up to its culpability for polluting the global atmospheric 
commons and stop polluting and/or pay reparations for its depredations.166  
Given that we have invested and continue to invest billions of dollars in 
REDD+, we can tilt at windmills or we can engage with what is really 
happening in the world. 
And, as noted above, REDD+ is happening. Because of its potentially 
enormous synergistic benefits, REDD+ has numerous, diverse 
supporters.167  REDD+’s success depends on how effectively it is 
 
 163.  See David Takacs, Carbon into Gold: Forest Carbon Offsets, Climate Change Adaptation, 
and International Law, 15 HASTINGS W.-NW J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 39, 84–87 (2009); David Takacs, 
supra note 9, at 523 (2010); TAKACS, supra note 17, at 5, 7. 
 164.  DURBAN GRP. FOR CLIMATE JUSTICE, NO REDD! NO REDD PLUS!: GLOBAL SIGN-ON 
CAMPAIGN AGAINST SCHEMES FOR REDUCING EMISSIONS FROM DEFORESTATION AND FOREST 
DEGRADATION (2010), available at http://www.durbanclimatejustice.org/wp-content/uploads 
/2010/04/durbanREDDstatement_en.pdf; Jesse Ribot & Anne M. Larson, Reducing REDD Risks, 6 
INT’L J. OF THE COMMONS 233, 233–35 (2012). 
 165.  Chhatre et al., supra note 161, at 657; REDD-NET, MARKET AND NON-MARKET COSTS OF 
REDD+ PERCEIVED BY LOCAL COMMUNITIES: A CASE STUDY IN EAST CAMBODIA 3 (2011), available 
at http://redd-net.org/files/case%20study%205%20-%20cambodia%20Alice %20final.pdf. 
 166.  For a review of the paradigm differences in how North and South view aid, see Takacs, supra 
note 46, at 719–27. 
 167.  Peter J. Kanowski et al., Implementing REDD+: Lessons from Analysis of Forest 
Governance, 14 ENVTL. SCI. & POL’Y 111, 112 (2011); Takacs, supra note 163, at 60–61; James 
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incorporated into future UNFCCC agreements, and on whether Northern 
jurisdictions begin to accept REDD+ offsets to fulfill compliance 
requirements.  But whether REDD+ goes boom or bust is not the relevant 
point for this paper – the point is the way decision makers, often in the 
private sector or NGO sector, are attempting to mainline EJ principles into 
the required criteria for certification.  Of course, it may also be that 
adhering to these principles may itself be contributing to REDD+’s 
uncertain future: The care stakeholders must invest to attend to EJ will 
make REDD+ more expensive.  But if it is too expensive to incorporate 
justice into offsets, perhaps that means no regulatory race to the bottom, 
and nations and industrial entities will have to clean up their own messes.  
On the other hand, REDD+’s failure would also means a failure to transfer 
billions of dollars from North to South while at the same time losing crucial 
opportunities to preserve the ecological matrix required by local 
communities in the global South, even more crucial as a resilience strategy 
for coming climate change. 
In my experience, both opponents and proponents of REDD+ may be 
right; it all depends upon how REDD+ is implemented.  Above all, if 
REDD+ is to contribute to greater international EJ – and not exacerbate 
existing inequities – its stakeholders must pay explicit attention to justice, 
and must develop tight standards with firm validation and verification that 
these standards are being met.168 
EJ advocates have objected to perceived climate change mandate 
havens in principle, and in court. EJ advocates challenged California’s 
AB32 on EJ grounds, alleging that the Scoping Plan to implement AB32 
fails to achieve the maximum GHG reductions possible, particularly due to 
methodological difficulties of the proposed cap and trade system.  This 
challenge ultimately failed.169  Separately, a coalition of 27 EJ and 
biodiversity-advocating NGOs signed a letter to Governor Brown arguing 
that allowing REDD+ to count as compliance-grade offsets is unlikely to 
help forests, due to methodological concerns.170  Furthermore, they allege, 
such allowances will only exacerbate EJ concerns in CA, as it allows 
 
Kanter, In London's Financial World, Carbon Trading is the New Big Thing, N.Y. TIMES (July 6, 
2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/06/business/worldbusiness/06carbon.html; Valerie Volcovici, 
supra note 157. 
 168.  See Takacs, supra note 46, at 717. 
 169.  Ass’n of Irritated Residents v. Cal. Air Res. Bd, 143 Cal. Rptr. 3d 65(Cal. Ct. App. 2012). 
 170.  Letter from Greenpeace et al., to Jerry Brown, Governor of California (May 3, 2013), 
available at http://www.redd-monitor.org/2013/05/06/greenpeace-friends-of-the-earth-us-sierra-club-
california-and-24-other-environmental-organisations-oppose-redd-offsets-in-californias-cap-and-trade-
scheme/. 
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continued industrial emissions within state borders.171 
On the other hand, the REDD Offsets Working Group (ROW) has 
been working with the State to implement “jurisdictional” REDD+, i.e. 
devising comprehensive plans to reduce deforestation on a state or province 
level; their pilot projects are based on a Memorandum of Understanding 
between California, Chiapas (Mexico) and Acre (Brazil).  This 
“jurisdictional” approach, they argue, allows for more comprehensive, 
human rights respecting, synergistic, methodologically robust means of 
implementing REDD+.172  For example, jurisdictional REDD+ “seek large-
scale changes in the rural development model that intensify agricultural 
yields, re-direct agricultural expansion away from forests and onto lands 
that have already been cleared, improve the livelihoods of indigenous 
people and other economically-marginalized rural communities, strengthen 
and expand networks of forest protected areas, and improve the 
conservation of soils, water resources, and biodiversity.173 
How to ensure that justice-respecting REDD+ actually delivers on its 
promise?  The Climate, Community & Biodiversity Alliance (CCBA) 
presents the most robust standards that ensure REDD+ will safeguard local 
communities.  A partnership of five NGOs with support from various 
business interests, the standards aim to “stimulate and promote land 
management activities that credibly mitigate global climate change, 
improve the wellbeing and reduce the poverty of local communities, and 
conserve biodiversity.”174  The CCBA has a set of standards (updated in 
December 2013) for project developers to use, and over 130 projects have 
used the standards.175  With even greater potential to improve EJ in 
REDD+, The CCBA has put out “Social & Environmental Standards” to be 
used on a jurisdictional level: That is to say, rather than assess REDD+ on a 
project-by-project basis, a state or province or nation uses REDD+ funding 
to promote reforestation or reduce deforestation resulting in stored CO2 
above a “business as usual” (BAU) baseline.176  Ecuador, Nepal, the 
 
 171.  Id. 
 172.  REDD OFFSET WORKING GROUP, supra note 156, at 10–14. 
 173.   Id. at 11.  
 174.  CONSERVATION INTERNATIONAL, CARE, RAINFOREST ALLIANCE, THE NATURE 
CONSERVANCY, & WILDLIFE CONSERVATION SOCIETY, CCB STANDARDS 1 (3d. ed. 2013), available at 
https://s3.amazonaws.com/CCBA/Third_Edition/CCB_Standards_Third_Edition _December_2013.pdf 
[hereinafter CCB Standards]. 
 175.  Id. at 3. 
 176.  ELEC. POWER RESEARCH INST., OVERVIEW OF SUBNATIONAL PROGRAMS TO REDUCE 
EMISSIONS FROM DEFORESTATION AND FOREST DEGRADATION (REDD) AS PART OF THE GOVERNORS' 
CLIMATE AND FOREST TASK FORCE, 1–5 (2012), available at http://www.gcftaskforce.org/ 
documents/EPRI.pdf. 
DT edits Takacs Author Proof Nov 2014 (Do Not Delete) 12/4/2014  7:12 PM 
348 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol. XXIV:315 
Brazilian state of Acre and the Indonesian province of Kalimantan have 
adopted the standards to govern REDD+.177 
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) has named a set of REDD+ safeguards,178 but these remain 
broad, non-binding, framework principles.  In the absence of a set of 
functional safeguards (i.e. with enough specificity that all stakeholders can 
implement them), the CCBA standards are our best model for how to 
implement REDD+ to achieve greater justice. Many EJ principles are 
incorporated into these voluntary standards project developers use as they 
seek certification to conduct REDD+ and sell the resulting carbon 
credits.179 While these standards remain voluntary, at some point state of 
the art soft law standards will become hard law when these standards 
become entrenched, or too ethically respected to contravene.180 
It is not that voluntary standards are a guaranteed key to unlock 
international EJ benefits.  They don’t automatically overcome nations’ 
legal responsibilities to legislate and enforce domestic and international 
human rights laws.181 It is not clear who enforces the standards should 
project actors not fulfill their contracted responsibilities.182 Because these 
projects are usually carried out and validated by private business interests, 
one is right to question whether they will prioritize justice when profits are 
at stake.183 Private businesses contract to verify results may be “captured” 
by their clients, and may be loathe to raise concerns for fear others will not 
hire them.184 Carbon businesses may accept such voluntary regulation in 
order to advertise their corporate social responsibility to consumers, and/or 
to show that industry can regulate itself, thus obviating the need for more 
formal legal strictures.185 Methodological difficulties still abound: For 
 
 177.  Country Overview, REDD STANDARDS, http://www.redd-standards.org/index.php? 
option=com_content&view=article&id=16&Itemid=19 (last visited Feb. 24, 2014).  
 178.  UNFCCC COP-16 para 72 and app I, para 2.  Note the “should” language where “shall” 
should be if the safeguards were to be binding. CONSERVATION INTERNATIONAL, supra  note 174, at 1. 
 179.    Eduard Merger et al., Options for REDD+ Voluntary Certification to Ensure Net GHG 
Benefits, Poverty Alleviation, Sustainable Management of Forests and Biodiversity Conservation, 2 
FORESTS 550, 551–54, tbl. 1 (2011),  available at http://www.mdpi.com/1999-4907/2/2/550. 
 180.  Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Strengthening International Regulation Through 
Transnational New Governance: Overcoming the Orchestration Deficit, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 
501, 543 (2009). 
 181.  Jason Morrison & Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Private and Quasi-Private Standard Setting, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 498, 524 (Bodansky et al. eds., 2007). 
 182.  Id. at 526. 
 183.  PETER T. MUCHLINSKI, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND THE LAW (2007). 
 184.  Takacs, supra note 163, at 75–77 (2009). 
 185. Morrison, supra note 181, at 504; Muchlinski, supra note 183, at 567. 
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example how to choose a baseline of predicted deforestation against which 
you measure the actual deforestation that occurs.  And accurate, fair 
verification of results may still be problematic.  But as I examine the 
criteria in these standards, it strikes me that jurisdictions and project 
proponents that actually adhered to these standards would fulfill the justice 
promises of REDD+. 
The standards provide excellent principles, which, if realized, would 
contribute to deeply equitable, justice-serving REDD+.  They name not 
only the principle objectives, but the criteria for delivering the principles, 
and indicators that provide the information that must be provided to 
demonstrate compliance with any principle.186  In their rigor and specificity 
– not only on social justice safeguards, but on climate and biodiversity 
benefits—the CCBA standards lend an imprimatur of legitimacy to 
investors, and result, on average, in higher premiums for carbon credits 
from projects using the standards.187 
For those looking for a set of standards, which, if realized, would 
maximize EJ in REDD+, I would point to these justice-serving, 
overarching principles (all direct quotes): 
The REDD+ program recognizes and respects rights to lands, 
territories, and resources; 
The benefits of the REDD+ program are shared equitably among 
all relevant rights holders and stakeholders; 
The REDD+ program improves long-term livelihood security and 
well-being of Indigenous Peoples and local communities with special 
attention to women and the most marginalized and/or vulnerable people; 
The REDD+ program contributes to good governance, to broader 
sustainable development and to social justice; 
All relevant rights holders and stakeholders participate fully and 
effectively in the REDD+ program; 
The REDD+ program complies with applicable local and national 
laws and international treaties, conventions and other instruments.188 
The standards seek to minimize environmental burdens and maximize 
environmental benefits.  The standards pay close attention to equitable 
benefit sharing, and require a transparent process of revealing and 
 
 186.  REDD+ SOCIAL & ENVIRONMENTAL STANDARDS 5 (2012), available at http://www.redd-
standards.org/files/REDDSES_Version_2/REDDSES_Version_2_-_10_September_2012.pdf 
[hereinafter REDD STANDARDS]. 
 187.  CCB Standards, supra note 174; THE CLIMATE, COMMUNITY, AND BIODIVERSITY ALLIANCE, 
https://s3.amazonaws.com/CCBA/CCB_Standards_FactSheet.pdf, citing PETERS-STANLEY ET AL., 
supra note 153, at 32. 
 188.  REDD STANDARDS, supra note 186, at 8, 11–13, 18, 22. 
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allocating potential benefits, costs and risks.189  REDD+ must improve 
“long-term livelihood security and well-being of indigenous Peoples and 
local communities with special attention to women and the most 
marginalized and/or vulnerable people.”190 The revised standards especially 
hope to support REDD+ benefits for “smallholder and community led-
projects,”191 which have face barriers in accessing REDD+ funds, often due 
to lack of institutional capacity needed to fulfill REDD+’s complicated 
guidelines.  The standards authors note “the serious risks notably for 
Indigenous Peoples and local communities, and in particular for 
marginalized and/or vulnerable social groups within those communities” 
and aims to allay those risks and provide benefits for all stakeholders.192 
The promoters of these standards see these as a fundamental building 
block to help states form their own, durable REDD+ social safeguards193  
To my eyes, they provide an excellent model for any jurisdiction looking to 
maximize justice when implementing REDD+. 
Furthermore, the standards were derived in an open, participatory 
manner with extensive input from an array of stakeholders,194 and include 
ancillary additional guidance about how to work with multi-stakeholder 
groups involved with decision-making around social and environmental 
standards for REDD+.195  And the standards epitomize current, best 
practices in Environmental Democracy;196 they require that “all relevant 
rights holders and stakeholders participate fully and effectively in the 
REDD+ program,” that builds upon local knowledge and requires 
“culturally appropriate, gender sensitive and effective participation.”197  
Furthermore, the standards demand a participatory property mapping 
process inclusive of women and marginalized and/or vulnerable people; 
transparent, gender-sensitive, free, prior, and informed consent of 
Indigenous peoples and any affected local communities, including for 
permission to us traditional Indigenous knowledge, innovations and 
 
 189.  Id. at 11–12. 
 190.  Id. at 12. 
 191.  CCB Standards, supra note 174, at 4. 
 192.  REDD STANDARDS, supra note 186, at 3. 
 193.  Id. at 4. 
 194.  History of the REDD+ SES Initiative, REDD STANDARDS, http://www.redd-
standards.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=9&Itemid=12 (last visited Feb. 24, 
2014). 
 195.  Information on Multi-Stakeholder Process, REDD STANDARDS, http://www.redd-
standards.org/files/Multistakeholder_-Information-Note-REDD-SES-ENG.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 
2014). 
 196.  For a review, see Takacs, supra note 16. 
 197.  REDD STANDARDS, supra note 186, at 18–19.  
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practices; transparent governance and grievance procedures; and capacity 
building so that all affected stakeholders are able to participate 
effectively.198 
In the absence of an agreed upon international framework for 
maximizing international EJ when implementing REDD+, these voluntary 
standards set the standard.  They would certainly provide a fine framework 
for future UNFCCC, World Bank, or other large-scale implementers or 
REDD+. 
Furthermore, these standards comprise a fine launchpad for those 
looking to avoid large scale environmental injustices when biofuels 
requirements lead to unjust climate change mandate havens.  It might be 
that biofuels proponents would be unable to employ these standards 
successfully.  That would not be because the standards are not apt for 
biofuels– they would adapt quite well to that context.  Instead, Northern 
lawmakers and biofuels business developers might find that they cannot 
implement biofuels plantations and avoid environmental injustice at the 
same time. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Many nations of the world seek to improve national and international 
environmental quality, and implement laws to effectuate this goal.  
Sometimes those laws are implemented with an express intent to ameliorate 
environmental injustices.  This is particularly true for laws meant to reduce 
GHG emissions and thus mitigate the worst incipient impacts of climate 
change, which will disproportionately harm world’s poorest citizens. 
Those laws aiming to slow the onset of climate change should not end 
up exacerbating the injustices they purport to assuage.  Laws promoting 
biofuel use and programs meant to promote REDD+ may not pay sufficient 
attention to the justice impacts they impose, and may worsen the condition 
of already poor citizens in the global South.  Just as strict domestic 
environmental laws in the North may lead to pollution havens in the South, 
so may Northern GHG reducing laws lead to unjust climate change 
mandate havens. 
US and EU regulations mandating ever increasing percentages of 
biofuels seem clearly to be causing environmental injustices in the 
Southern nations growing feedstock to meet these mandates.  Northern 
governments and their citizens are paying insufficient attention to these 
injustices.  Some voluntary standards are emerging, but they pay 
 
 198.  Id. at 8–9, 13, 19–21. 
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insufficient attention to EJ impacts, and are slow to be adopted.  The US 
has scarcely considered biofuels justice impacts beyond its borders. 
REDD+ is making greater progress towards streamlining EJ principles 
into its implementation.  While both biofuels and REDD+ advocates stress 
the promotion of justice for Southern nations helping to fulfill the 
mandates, widespread cultivation of biofuels feedstock is going to result in 
land grabs and difficult labor. On the other hand, REDD+ has vast potential 
to preserve the ecological matrix essential for rural communities to survive 
and thrive while potentially transferring billions of dollars of wealth from 
North to South.  While the social and environmental standards discussed 
here are not panaceas, they do pose an excellent model for mandate havens 
to become centers of greater EJ in the world. 
We should clean up the messes we have made without making bigger 
messes for those in distant nations, out of sight and out of mind.  Strict 
environmental justice criteria should be developed and implemented to 
avoid creating unjust mandate havens.  Those criteria should be deeply 
equitable, i.e. they should result in laws and policies that act in synergy to 
maximize the health and potential of all individuals, communities, and 
ecosystems. 
